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Abstract
We propose a two-layered tree network model that decomposes financial contagion into a
global component, composed of inter-country contagion effects, and a local component made
up of inter-institutional contagion channels. The model is effectively applied to a database
containing time series of daily CDS spreads of major European financial institutions (banks
and insurance companies), and reveals the importance of monitoring both channels to assess
financial contagion. The empirical application revealed evidence of a high inter-country and
inter-institutional vulnerability at the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 and during
the sovereign crisis in 2011. The result further identifies Belgium and France as central to
the inter-country contagion in the Euro area during the financial crisis, while Italy dominated
during the sovereign crisis. The French corporates Groupama, Credit Industriel, and Caisse
d’Epargne were central in the inter-institutional contagion in both crises.
Keywords: Financial crisis, Graphical Lasso, Inter-country contagion, Inter-institutional
contagion, Sovereign crisis, Sparse covariance selection
1. Introduction
Over the past two decades, networks models have seen significant applications with various
contributions in the fields of computer science, information sciences, neuroscience, bioinfor-
matics, statistics, economics, and finance, etc. Also, over the past decade, especially after
the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008, the study of financial and economic networks have
attracted the attention of not only researchers but regulatory institutions like the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial
Stability Board (FSB). From the perspective of regulators, financial networks present a frame-
work to identify systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) at the global, regional
and country levels, as well as providing a scheme to complement micro-prudential supervision
with macro-prudential surveillance to ensure financial stability (see Arregui et al., 2013; IMF,
2011; Minoiu and Sharma, 2014; Moghadam and Viñals, 2010; Viñals et al., 2012).
The explosion in the study of financial networks has become vital following the lessons
from the global financial crisis. Bernanke (2013) emphasized that the events that led to the
GFC can be attributed to two main factors: (i) triggers - the initial losses or shocks that
affected many institutions, and (ii) vulnerabilities - the preexisting structural weaknesses of
the system that amplifies these initial shocks. The key trigger of the GFC were the losses suf-
fered by many institutions due to subprime mortgages, while the complex interconnectedness
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of institutions created the vulnerabilities for risk transmission (see Ahelegbey et al., 2016a;
Battiston et al., 2012; Billio et al., 2012; Diebold and Yilmaz, 2014; Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission, 2011; Hautsch et al., 2015). Acemoglu et al. (2015) showed that when the mag-
nitude of shocks affecting financial institutions are sufficiently small, a highly interconnected
system of institutions provides a risk-sharing mechanism which enhances financial stability.
However, beyond a certain threshold of connectedness, coupled with a high magnitude of
shocks, the densely interconnected system of institutions serves rather as a mechanism for
shock propagation and spillovers among markets, leading to the systemic crisis.
Like other living organisms, the interaction among financial institutions can be quite
complex and very complicated. This stems from the fact that interactions among institu-
tions emerge through diverse forms. Such interactions can take the form of direct deposits,
investments, loans, derivatives, futures contracts etc. Other forms of interactions occur via
ownership, partnerships or joint ventures, and through stakeholder relationships in the form
of board interlocks, former colleagues or migration of workers from one institution to another.
Due to these diverse forms of relationships, analyzing the network among financial institu-
tions can be very tedious. Most existing analytical works therefore focus on either the use
of balance sheet and other financial statements to extract such networks (see Cont et al.,
2013; Georg, 2013; Georg and Minoiu, 2014; Minoiu and Reyes, 2013), whiles others rely on
market data to study the co-movement of the returns/volatilities of security prices (Adrian
and Brunnermeier, 2016; Ahelegbey et al., 2016a; Billio et al., 2012; Brownlees and Engle,
2016; Diebold and Yilmaz, 2014; Hautsch et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2011; Segoviano and
Goodhart, 2009). There is not much work on the former largely due to lack of transparency
in the balance sheet information coupled with the difficulty in obtaining such data and the
low frequency of update, which is either annually or at best, quarterly.
It is well known in the finance literature that stock prices reflect new market and firm-level
information (Roll, 1988). As a consequence, returns/volatilities of assets can be decomposed
into systematic and idiosyncratic components as demonstrated in the arbitrage pricing theory
(APT) and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) (Ross, 1976; Sharpe, 1964). Tang et al.
(2010) showed that all financial crises are alike and although the triggers may differ, the
vulnerabilities remain predominantly the same across systemic breakdowns. They identified
three potential channels for contagion effects: idiosyncratic, market and country channels.
Dungey and Gajurel (2015) also identified three channels of contagion in the banking industry,
namely, systematic, idiosyncratic and volatility spillover. Their results show that shocks
transmitted via idiosyncratic channels are highly likely to destabilize the banking system
than through systematic channels.
This paper contributes to the application of networks to model the decomposition of
asset returns/volatilities. For related works see Ahelegbey and Giudici (2014); Barigozzi
and Brownlees (2016); Diebold and Yilmaz (2014); Dungey and Gajurel (2015); Tang et al.
(2010). Following these stream of the literature, we develop a two-layered tree-like model
that decomposes financial contagion into a global component, composed of inter-country
contagion effects, and a local component made up of inter-institutional contagion channels.
The first layer models the inter-institution exposures driven by country-level indicators, and
the second layer models the inter-country contagion driven by regional/global market factors.
We combined both layers to model the total exposure of institutions as a composition of
idiosyncratic inter-institutional shock channels, and a systematic component - composed of
institution’s sensitivity to regional/global financial market and inter-country risk. We focus
on modeling the inter-institution and inter-country exposures via a sparse covariance structure
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as a network model using the graphical lasso approach (see Dempster, 1972; Friedman et al.,
2008; Meinshausen and Bühlmann, 2006).
We assess the efficiency of our model to analyze financial contagion among 50 top European
financial institutions, for which corporate default swap spread prices are available, for the
period covering 2008–2015. We have a total of 108,316 observations, from 01/01/2008 to
31/12/2015. Each observation describes the daily CDS spread of financial corporations (bank
and insurance companies), belonging to 11 different countries. The empirical application
revealed a high inter-country and inter-institutional vulnerability at the onset of the global
financial crisis in 2008 and the sovereign crisis in 2011.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model formu-
lation and a discussion on the inference approach to network extraction from the observed
data. Section 3 provides the details of the network analysis methods applied in the empirical
analysis. Section 4 presents a discussion of the empirical application and results.
2. Econometric Model
In this section, we present the model formulation and inference approach to network
extraction from the observed data.
2.1. Model Formulation
We present a two-layer network model in a tree-like configuration. The first layer is an
inter-institution model, and the second is an inter-country configuration. Figure 1 illustrates
the tree-like structure of the model. The blue rectangle node represents the observed insti-
tutional returns, Y . The red circled nodes represent a set of inter-institution model latent
variables that include the country sector aggregate indicators, X, and institution-level shocks,
U . The green circled nodes are inter-country model latent variables that capture the state of
regional/global market factors, F , and country-level shocks, V . The parameters of the model
are (Λ,Θ, A,B). Our main objective is the sparse structure associated with A and B.
Y
U
B
X
V
A
F
Λ
Θ
Figure 1: An illustration of the tree-like model configuration.
2.1.1. Inter-Institution Model
Let Yt = {Yi,t}, i = 1, . . . , n, be a n × 1 vector of log returns of n institutions observed
at time t, where Yi,t is the return for institution i at time t. Suppose each institution belong
to exactly one of p-finite number of countries. We denote with Xt = {Xl,t}, l = 1, . . . , p,
an p × 1 vector of national financial sector indices, where Xl,t is country-l financial sector
index at time t proxied by averaging the return of institutions in country-l. We formulate an
inter-institution model where the returns of institution-i depends on the national financial
sector index for the country to which institution-i belongs and spillovers from other national
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financial sectors as well as exposures to shocks from other institutions. Thus, the basic inter-
institution model in matrix form is specified as follows
Y ′ = ΘX ′ + ξ′Y = ΘX ′ +BU ′ (1)
where Y and X are T ×n and T ×p matrix of observations, ξY is T ×n matrix of idiosyncratic
terms which can be expressed in terms of U - a T ×n matrix of institution-level shocks, Θ and
B are n× p and n× n coefficient matrices, such that Θi,l measures the exposure of Yi to Xl,
and B has unit diagonal terms, i.e, the magnitude of the exposure of institution i to its own
shocks is 1. We assume X and U are uncorrelated, and the elements of U are independent and
identically normal with zero mean and diagonal covariance matrix, ΣU = diag(σ2u1 , . . . , σ
2
un).
From these assumptions, the covariance structure of the inter-institution model is given by
ΣY = ΘΣXΘ′ +BΣUB′ = ΘΣXΘ′ +BΣ1/2U (BΣ
1/2
U )
′
= ΘΣXΘ′ +B∗B∗
′ = ΨY + ΩY (2)
where B∗ = BΣ1/2U is a transformation of B. Equation (2) shows that total variance of
institution returns can be decomposed into a systematic component of country-level indica-
tors, (ΨY = ΘΣXΘ′), and an idiosyncratic aspect of inter-institution shock transmissions,
(ΩY = B∗B∗
′).
2.1.2. Inter-Country Model
We further construct a inter-country model based on the assumption that the observed
national financial sector index depends on a small number of common financial market indi-
cators that signal regional/global performance of the financial sector, as well as exposures to
inter-national financial sector shocks. We denote with F , the regional/global market factors.
Thus, we model the inter-country relations as a factor model given by
X ′ = ΛF ′ + ξ′X = ΛF ′ +AV ′ (3)
where F is T×r matrix (r < p), Λ is p×r matrix of country sensitivity to F , ξX is T×pmatrix
of idiosyncratic terms which can be expressed in terms of V - a T × p matrix of country-level
shocks, A is p×p matrix of coefficients with unit main diagonal terms such that Ak,l measures
the impact of a shock of country Xl on country Xk. By definition, A has unit diagonal terms,
i.e, the magnitude of the exposure of country k to its own shocks is 1. Here, we assume F and
V are uncorrelated, and the elements of V are independent and identically normal with zero
mean and diagonal covariance matrix, ΣV = diag(σ2v1 , . . . , σ
2
vp). The covariance structure of
the inter-country model is given by
ΣX = ΛΣFΛ′ +AΣVA′ = ΛΣFΛ′ +AΣ1/2V (AΣ
1/2
V )
′
= ΛΣFΛ′ +A∗A∗
′ = ΨX + ΩX (4)
Here, the covariance of F is an identity matrix by normalization, and A∗ = AΣ1/2V is a
transformation of A. From the above equation, the total variance of country-level indicators
decomposes into a systematic component composed of country sensitivity to variations in
regional/global market factors, (ΨX = ΛΣFΛ′), and an idiosyncratic part composed of inter-
country shock transmission, (ΩX = A∗A∗
′).
4
2.1.3. Nested Inter-Institution and Inter-Country Model
From equations (1) and (3), we can merge the two models such that the combined model
is given by
Y ′ = (ΘΛ)F ′ + Θξ′X + ξ′Y = ΦF ′ + Θ(AV ′) +BU ′ (5)
where Φ = ΘΛ, (ΘA) and B are coefficient matrices, which capture institution sensitivity
to regional/global market factors, inter-country and inter-institution shock transmissions,
respectively. Here, we assume U and V are independent and identically normal with zero
means and diagonal covariance matrices, ΣU and ΣV , U and V are uncorrelated, and F is
uncorrelated with U and V . The covariance structure of the combined model is given by
ΣY = ΦΣFΦ′ + ΘΩXΘ′ + ΩY (6)
Comparing (6) with (2), the systematic component of the total variance in individual institu-
tion returns further decomposes into sensitivity to variation in regional/global market factors,
(ΦΣFΦ′), and sensitivity to inter-country shock co-movement, (ΘΩXΘ′). Figure 2 depicts a
graphical illustration of the results in (6).
ΩXΣF ΩY
ΣY
Figure 2: A decomposition of institutional risk as function of regional/global market risk, ΣF , inter-country
risk, ΩX , and inter-institution idiosyncratic risk, ΩY .
2.2. Network Models
From (1) and (5), the simultaneous system of equations can be operationalized as a net-
work model where the coefficient matrix B can be modeled as a sparse matrix encoding the
exposures among individual institutions such that
Bi,j
{
= 0 if Yi is not exposed to Uj (shocks on Yj)
, 0 if Yi is exposed to Uj (shocks on Yj)
(7)
Likewise, the coefficients matrix A in (3) can be modeled as a sparse matrix encoding the
exposures among country sectors such that
Ak,l
{
= 0 if Xk is not exposed to Vl (shocks on Xl)
, 0 if Xi is exposed to Vl (shocks on Xl)
(8)
Furthermore, the transformations B∗ = BΣ1/2U and A∗ = AΣ
1/2
V does not affect the sparsity of
B and A respectively. The elements of B∗ and A∗ are such that B∗ij = Bijσuj , i, j = 1, . . . , n
and A∗kl = Aklσvl , k, l = 1, . . . , p. Thus, B∗ij = 0 if Bij = 0, and A∗kl = 0 if Akl = 0. From (4)
and (2), the decomposition of the total variance-covariance between country-k and country-l
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(or institution-i and institution-j) is given by
ΣX,kl =
{
ΨX,kl + ΩX,kl if k , l
ΨX,kk + ΩX,kk if k = l
ΣY,ij =
{
ΨY,ij + ΩY,ij if i , j
ΨY,ii + ΩY,ii if i = j
(9)
From the above decomposition, the non-systematic component can be expressed such that
ΩX,kl =
{
A∗k A
∗′
l if k , l
A∗k A
∗′
k if k = l
ΩY,ij =
{
B∗i B∗
′
j if i , j
B∗i B∗
′
j if i = j
(10)
where A∗k = AkΣ
1/2
V = (Ak1σv1 , . . . , Akpσvp), with Akk = 1, where Ak is the k-th equation
vector of coefficients encoding the exposures among country sectors. Similarly, B∗i = BiΣ
1/2
U =
(Bi1σu1 , . . . , Binσun), and Bii = 1, where Bi is the i-th equation vector of coefficients encoding
the exposures among institutions. We quickly notice that if Aks = 0,∀s = 1, . . . , p, s , k,
then ΩX,kk = σ2vk , i.e, the non-systematic variance of country-k will only be composed of only
country-k’s own risk. Similar argument holds for institution-level non-systematic variance.
Following the literature on graphical models (Ahelegbey et al., 2016a,b; Carvalho and
West, 2007; Dahlhaus and Eichler, 2003; Eichler, 2007), we model ΩX and ΩY as a undirected
sparse covariance structures with a corresponding binary 0/1 matrices, GX ∈ {0, 1}p×p and
GY ∈ {0, 1}n×n, respectively, such that
GX,kl = GX,lk =
{
0 if ΩX,kl = 0
1 if ΩX,kl , 0
GY,ij = GY,ji =
{
0 if ΩY,ij = 0
1 if ΩY,ij , 0
(11)
Clearly, by comparing (10) and (11), it can be shown that ΩX,kl = 0 if Akl = Alk = 0
and either Akz = 0 or Alz = 0, where z = {1, . . . , p}\{k, l}. Thus, shocks on country-k and
country-l must be mutually independent, and both countries are not impacted by shocks from
country-z. Therefore, the country and institution network graphs adopted in this application
represent not only marginal independence but conditional independence.
2.3. Network Structure Inference
Given Y (a panel data of returns of institutions from different countries), and X (ob-
tained by averaging elements in Y by countries), our objective is to analyze GX and GY ,
the non-systematic inter-country and inter-institution networks associated with ΩX and ΩY ,
respectively, aiming for a more parsimonious and sparse covariance structure. The approach
considered in our estimation is as follows:
1. Obtain the factors, F , via singular value decomposition (SVD) of X, and estimate the
residuals of (3), i.e., ξˆ′X = X ′ − ΛˆFˆ ′
2. Estimate the inter-country model residual covariance matrix, ΩˆX = Cov(ξˆX)
3. Estimate the inter-country idiosyncratic network GˆX determined by zeros in ΩˆX
4. Regress Y on (Fˆ , ξˆX), and estimate the residuals of (5), i.e., ξˆ′Y = Y ′ − (ΦˆFˆ ′ + Θˆξˆ′X)
5. Estimate the inter-institution model residual covariance matrix, ΩˆY = Cov(ξˆY )
6. Estimate the inter-institution idiosyncratic network GˆY determined by zeros in ΩˆY
Determining Number of Factors
We adopt the singular value decomposition (SVD) of X to obtain the underlying re-
gional/global factors that drive country indicators. We estimate the number of factors via
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the information criterion (IC) of (Bai and Ng, 2002). The IC specification is given by
IC(r) = log
( 1
pT
T∑
t=1
(Xt − ΛˆFˆ r)2
)
+ r
(
p+ T
pT
)
log
(
pT
p+ T
)
(12)
The number of factors is estimated by minimizing IC(r) for r = 1, . . . , rmax. It well-known
in the factor models literature that the Bai and Ng (2002) information criterion tend to
overestimate the number of factors. Despite this limitation, the above criterion is considered
to be the conventional method in factor model determination. To control the number of
factors and avoid over-fitting, we set rmax = 5.
Sparse Covariance Estimation
There is an extremely large number of methods for sparse covariance estimation that rep-
resent conditional independencies. Such network graphs are estimated by setting elements of
the inverse covariance matrix to zero (see Dempster, 1972; Friedman et al., 2008; Meinshausen
and Bühlmann, 2006). We adopt the graphical lasso approach of Friedman et al. (2008) to
estimate the sparse structure associates with the non-systematic variance-covariance matri-
ces. Let Ω = Cov(ξ) be the sample covariance matrix of ξ = {ξX , ξY }. The graphical lasso
scheme involves minimizing the following function
log(|S|) + trace(ΩS−1) + ρ||S||1 (13)
where ρ is the shrinkage parameter, S is a positive-definite and symmetric matrix, |S| is the
determinant of S, and ||S||1 is the element L1 norm of S, i.e., the sum of the absolute values
of the elements of S. In this application, we implement the glasso R-package to estimate the
underlying sparse network graph associated with Ω = {ΩX ,ΩY }.
3. Descriptive Analysis of Network Graphs
We analyze the estimated network based on network density, maximal community sizes,
average path length, node degree, betweenness and eigenvector centrality. We define these
measures briefly.
Density
The density of a network measures the number of estimated links in the network divided by
the total number of possible links. For a n number of institutions and given that out estimate
network is an undirected network, there are n(n− 1)/2 possible links. Standard applications
indicate that the higher the network density the higher the degree of interconnectedness of
the markets.
Network Communities
A network is said to have a community (cohesive) structure if a subset of nodes in the
network can be grouped into sets of nodes that has dense connections between its members
than to the rest of the network. The higher the maximal community size (number of closely
connected nodes), the higher and broader the effect of shock propagation in the community.
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Average Path Length
The average path length is the average shortest path between two nodes. It represents the
average graph-distance between all pair of nodes, where connected nodes have graph distance
equals to 1. The higher the graph distance the longer time it takes for a default cascade to
cause a systemic breakdown. The average path length for a network with n-nodes is given by
lG =
1
n(n− 1)
∑
i,j
di,j (14)
where di,j is the shortest path between the nodes i and j.
Degree
The concept of a degree in network analysis is crucial to understand the most connected
institution in terms of shock transmission. It measures the total number of neighbors that
are connected to a given institution. The higher the degree the higher the influence (or
vulnerability) of an institution in the network.
Betweenness Centrality
Betweenness centrality measures the extent to which a institution lies on the path between
other institutions. In other words, it quantifies the number of times a institution acts as a
bridge to connect other institutions. It is computed as follows:
B(i) =
∑
j,i,k
dj,k(i)
dj,k
(15)
where dj,k(i) is the number of shortest paths between node-j and node-k that pass-through
node-i, and dj,k is the total number of shortest paths between node-j and node-k. An node
with higher betweenness score can potentially influence the spread of risk through the network.
Eigenvector Centrality
Eigenvector centrality assigns a score to each institution in a way that is proportional to
the importance scores of its neighbors. Given a graph matrix G, eigenvector centrality score
involves solving the following problem
Gv = λ1v (16)
where v is a vector containing the eigenvectors and λ1 is the largest eigenvalue of G.
4. Empirical Assessment of Financial Contagion
We used the Bloomberg database to retrieve daily time-series data for CDS spread prices
of top European financial institutions (bank and insurance companies). The dataset contains
50 institutions from 11 European countries covering 01/01/2008 to 31/12/2015. The coun-
tries represented by the different banks include Austria(2), Belgium(2), Finland(1), France(8),
Germany(12), Greece(4), Ireland(1), Italy(8), Netherlands(3), Portugal(3), and Spain(5). Ta-
ble 1 presents a detailed description of the institutions in our dataset classified by countries.
Out of the 50 institutions, 42 are banks and 8 are insurance companies.
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No. Name Ticker Type Country Country code
1 Erste Group Bank EBS Bank Austria AT
2 Raiffeisen Bank International RBI Bank Austria AT
3 Dexia DEXB Bank Belgium BE
4 KBC Group KBC Bank Belgium BE
5 Pohjola Bank Oyj POHS Bank Finland FI
6 BNP Paribas BNP Bank France FR
7 Caisse d’Epargne GCE Bank France FR
8 CIC Credit Mutuel Group CIC Bank France FR
9 Credit Agricole ACA Bank France FR
10 Groupama GPA Insurance France FR
11 Natixis-BPCE Group BPCE Bank France FR
12 Score Se SCR Insurance France FR
13 Societe Generale GLE Bank France FR
14 Allianz ALV Insurance Germany GE
15 Commerzbank CBK Bank Germany GE
16 Deutsche Bank DBK Bank Germany GE
17 DZ Bank DZB Bank Germany GE
18 Hannover Ruck. HNR Insurance Germany GE
19 Hudson Bay HBNC Insurance Germany GE
20 IKB Deutsche Industriebank IKB Bank Germany GE
21 Landesbank Baden-W. LDBW Bank Germany GE
22 Landesbank Berlin H. LDBH Bank Germany GE
23 Landesbank Hessen-T. LDHT Bank Germany GE
24 Muenchener Ruck. MUV Insurance Germany GE
25 Nord/LB NLB Bank Germany GE
26 Alpha Bank ALPH Bank Greece GR
27 Eurobank Ergasias EURB Bank Greece GR
28 National Bank of Greece ETE Bank Greece GR
29 Piraeus Bank PEIR Bank Greece GR
30 Permanent TSB PTSB Bank Ireland IR
31 Assicurazioni Generali G Insurance Italy IT
32 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena BMPS Bank Italy IT
33 Banca Popolare di Milano PMI Bank Italy IT
34 Banca Popolare di Sondrio BPSO Bank Italy IT
35 Intesa Sanpaolo ISP Bank Italy IT
36 Mediobanca MB Bank Italy IT
37 Unione di Banche Italiane UBI Bank Italy IT
38 Unipolsai US Insurance Italy IT
39 Aegon Bank AEG Bank Netherlands NL
40 ING Groep INGA Bank Netherlands NL
41 Rabobank RABO Bank Netherlands NL
42 SNS Bank SNS Bank Netherlands NL
43 Banco BPI BPI Bank Portugal PT
44 Banco Comercial Portugues BCP Bank Portugal PT
45 Novo Banco BKES Bank Portugal PT
46 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria BBVA Bank Spain SP
47 Banco de Sabadell SAB Bank Spain SP
48 Banco Popular Espanol POP Bank Spain SP
49 Banco Santander SAN Bank Spain SP
50 Bankinter BKT Bank Spain SP
Table 1: Description of Banks Classified By Country.
Let Pi,t be the daily CDS spread price of institution i at time t andRi,t = logPi,t−logPi,t−1
be the log-returns. We average the returns of the institutions in the sample for a given country
to construct country-level observations. Figure 3 represents the evolution of the 50 considered
CDS spreads and spread returns over time. It also reports the evolution of the aggregate
country returns. The institutions are grouped according to country blocks: Austria (in red),
Belgium (green), Finland (blue), France (violet), Germany (orange), Greece (yellow), Ireland
(cyan), Italy (magenta), Netherlands (sky-blue), Portugal (brown), and Spain (coral).
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Figure 3: Time series of the corporate default swap spread prices and returns. The institutions represented
in the series are colored using country groupings: Austria (AT - red), Belgium ( BG - green), Finland (FI -
blue), France (FR - violet), Germany (GE - orange), Greece (GR - yellow), Ireland (IR - cyan), Italy (IT -
magenta), Netherlands (NL - sky-blue), Portugal (PT - brown), and Spain (SP - coral).
From the figure, we notice that much volatility in the CDS spreads concentrates during
the peak of the financial crisis period, September 2008, in which we observe extreme events
for Dutch, French, German, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish institutions. Aggregating over
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countries, the most volatile ones are Austria, Finland, Greece, and Ireland. Large variations
on the observed spreads are also observed during the sovereign crisis, particularly during
August and September 2011; but, in this case, events are most concentrated around Greek
and some southern European countries (such as Italy and Spain).
Looking at individual dates we notice evidence of “contagion effect”, within countries
but also between countries. For example, on September 29th, 2008 a ‘large shock’ affected
Credit Industriel. On the same day, large variations were observed not only among other
French institutions but also among German, Italian, Spanish and Greek institutions. At the
onset of the crisis, on March 7th, 2008, another large spread increase was observed for the
French Groupama corporate (∆CDS = 6.15). The same day, large variations occurred in other
institutions in France, Italy, Spain, Greece, and Germany.
We proceed with the application of our model to the data. To better understand the
results, we compared the structure and centrality of the idiosyncratic inter-country and inter-
financial-institutions connectedness over three different time windows: (a) the financial crisis
period (2008-2009), (b) the sovereign crisis period (2010-2012) and (c) the post-crisis period
(2013-2015). The application further considered the top four economies in the Euro area over
the sup-periods. The analysis finally delves into the yearly connections among the countries
and financial institutions over the sample period.
4.1. Inter-Country Sector Network
We start the application of our models considering the inter-country networks that can be
obtained in the different time periods. Figure 4 shows the connectedness of the countries in
a network format; Table 2 presents the global summary statistics of the network graph, and
Table 3 contains the corresponding summary centrality measures.
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Figure 4: Inter-country Network across sub-periods. The links indicate signs of the correlation coefficients,
green indicate positive correlations and red for negative correlations. The nodes are countries categorized into
southern Europe (in blue), western Europe (in green), and north-central Europe (in red).
Links Density Community Size (max.) Average Path Length
2008-2009 6 0.11 4 2.00
2010-2012 2 0.04 3 1.33
2013-2015 4 0.07 3 1.33
Table 2: Summary statistics of the inter-country network over the sub-periods.
To aid interpretation, we represent distinguish the links using the signs of the correlation
coefficients. Positive correlations are depicted in green and negative correlations are in red.
Furthermore, we position the countries based on their regional locations. Southern European
countries are in blue, western European countries in green, and northern-central European
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countries in red. From Figure 4 and Table 2, we notice that the inter-country network is
more connected during the financial crisis period: the number of links, the density, and the
community size is all at their maxima. This result emphasizes the fact that the crisis affected
most European countries. Consistent with the financial network literature, the interconnect-
edness among the countries increased during the financial crisis. On the other hand, during
the sovereign crisis, the network is less connected, indicating that the crisis concentrated on
some southern European countries. The post-crisis situation is somewhat in between. In all
cases, most correlations are negative and are between “core” countries, indicated in red in the
figure, and “peripheral” countries, indicated in blue.
It is important to understand which countries are most central, in the different periods.
This may give an indication about which countries are more contagious/subject to contagion
(see Table 3). We observe from Table 3 that the smaller countries, such as Belgium, Portugal,
Criteria Rank 2008-2009 2010-2012 2013-2015
Degree 1 BE - 4 IT - 2 FR - 2
2 PT - 3 AT - 1 IR - 2
3 AT - 1 BE - 1 AT - 1
4 FR - 1 FI - 0 NL - 1
5 GR - 1 FR - 0 PT - 1
Betweenness 1 BE - 12 IT - 1 FR - 1
2 PT - 9 AT - 0 IR - 1
3 AT - 0 BE - 0 AT - 0
4 FI - 0 FI - 0 BE - 0
5 FR - 0 FR - 0 FI - 0
Eigenvector 1 BE - 1 IT - 1 FR - 1
2 PT - 0.80 BE - 0.71 IR - 1
3 AT - 0.46 AT - 0.71 NL - 0.71
4 GR - 0.46 FI - 0.00 SP - 0.71
5 IT - 0.46 FR - 0.00 AT - 0.71
Table 3: Top five countries ranked according to degree, betweenness and eigenvector centrality. The values
represent the centrality metrics and bold face variables represent the top rank countries.
and Austria, were more central to the spread of risk during the financial crisis, according to
all centrality measures. During the sovereign crisis, Italy was central to the spread of the
crisis in the EU. This is consistent with the events between 2010-2012, such that, in mid-
2011, the threat to European financial institutions and the global financial system became
severe when the crisis of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal began to affect Italy (the third largest
Euro zone economy and second biggest debtor to bond investors). With many European
institutions heavily exposed to Italy, the sovereign crisis quickly spread within and beyond
Europe. The post-crisis period shows France (the third largest Eurozone economy) as the
most central country to the spread of risk in the EU. These findings are consistent with the
fact that, during crises, contagion effects are higher and shocks are propagated via high order
interconnections, which often hit larger banking systems.
4.2. Inter-Institution Network
We now consider inter-institution networks. Figure 5 depicts the sub-period network
graphs. The institutions are grouped according to country blocks: Austria (in red), Belgium
(green), Finland (blue), France (violet), Germany (orange), Greece (yellow), Ireland (cyan),
Italy (magenta), Netherlands (sky-blue), Portugal (brown), and Spain (coral). Tables 4 and 5
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contains the results of the summary statistics and centrality measures of the inter-institution
sub-period networks, respectively.
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Figure 5: Inter-institutional Network across sub-periods. The institutions are grouped according to country
blocks: Austria (in red), Belgium (green), Finland (blue), France (violet), Germany (orange), Greece (yellow),
Ireland (cyan), Italy (magenta), Netherlands (sky-blue), Portugal (brown), and Spain (coral).
The institutional idiosyncratic connections in Figure 5 shows that the vulnerability of
the European financial system was much higher during the global financial crisis than in the
sovereign crisis and post-crisis periods. The total number of links, density and community
size as shown in Table 4 emphasizes the above results. Given that the magnitude of shocks
Links Density Community Size (max.) Average Path Length
2008-2009 307 0.25 15 1.79
2010-2012 104 0.08 11 2.16
2013-2015 81 0.07 11 2.38
Table 4: Summary statistics of inter-institution network over the sub-periods.
Criteria Rank 2008-2009 2010-2012 2013-2015
Degree 1 GPA - 28 GCE - 26 GCE - 27
2 CIC - 26 NLB - 20 PEIR - 11
3 US - 25 GPA - 12 LDBH - 7
4 LDBH - 23 UBI - 12 GPA - 6
5 GCE - 22 US - 8 ALV - 6
Betweenness 1 CIC - 156.2 GCE - 332.7 GCE - 586.3
2 GPA - 97.0 NLB - 215.2 PEIR - 107.9
3 US - 75.9 US - 64.1 SNS - 58.4
4 GCE - 50.2 UBI - 63.6 US - 55.5
5 LDBH - 49.7 GPA - 51.9 EURB - 45.2
Eigenvector 1 GPA - 1 GCE - 1 GCE - 1
2 US - 0.91 NLB - 0.79 ALV - 0.42
3 CIC - 0.91 GPA - 0.60 LDBW - 0.40
4 LDBH - 0.88 UBI - 0.60 PEIR - 0.39
5 GCE - 0.84 ACA - 0.44 HNR - 0.37
Table 5: Top five institutions ranked according to degree, betweenness and eigenvector centrality. The values
represent the centrality metrics and bold face variables represent the top rank institutions.
affecting financial institutions are sufficiently large at the onset of the crisis, during early-2008,
the high vulnerability of the financial system via institutional interconnections served as a
mechanism for shock propagation and spillovers among markets, leading to systemic crisis.
This corroborates the assertion of (Acemoglu et al., 2015; Elliott et al., 2014; Glasserman and
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Young, 2016). In addition to the high interconnectedness, the average path length indicates
that the propagation of risk during the financial crisis was much faster than the sovereign crisis
and post-crisis period. The sovereign crisis also display a more interconnected system than
the post-crisis period. This is consistent with the economic intuition that interconnections
are relatively higher during crisis periods.
The centrality measures in Table 5 shows that during the financial crisis, the most central
institutions were Groupama (one of the largest European insurance groups) and Credit Indus-
triel (CIC). The importance of Groupama, based on degree and eigenvector centrality, during
the crisis, leans toward the interpretation of centrality as a “source of contagion” (hub) rather
than “effect”. CIC, on the other hand, was influential in terms of intermediating between in-
stitutions. These institutions act as “agents of contagion”, especially during the financial
crisis period. During the sovereign and post-crisis periods, the French Caisse d’Epargne was
the most connected and central institution in both periods.
In the next sections, we consider the inter-institution graphs within the top four largest
economies of the EU to further establish our conclusions.
4.2.1. Germany
From the estimated networks over the sub-periods, Figure 6 and Tables 6 and 7 show
the structure and summary of connections among the German institutions represented in
our data. We observe from Figure 6 and Table 6 that the German institutions were much
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Figure 6: Germany: Within-Country Networks
Links Density Community Size (max.) Average Path Length
2008-2009 46 0.70 7 1.30
2010-2012 14 0.21 5 1.61
2013-2015 12 0.18 4 1.43
Table 6: Germany: Summary statistics of inter-institution network over the sub-periods.
Rank 2008-2009 2010-2012 2013-2015
1 IKB - 1 NLB - 1 LDBH - 1
2 HNR - 0.99 MUV - 0.69 LDBW - 0.9
3 NLB - 0.93 HNR - 0.6 ALV - 0.9
4 LDBH - 0.91 ALV - 0.6 HNR - 0.9
5 MUV - 0.84 CBK - 0.46 MUV - 0.9
Table 7: Germany: Institutions ranked by eigenvector centrality
connected during the financial crisis, and less so during the sovereign and post-crisis periods.
There were both positive and negative correlations, indicating a diversified “portfolio” of
institutions: more risky and more safe. IKB Deutsche Industriebank (IKB) was reported as
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the most central institution during the financial crisis, Nord/LB (NLB) dominated during
the sovereign crisis, and Landesbank, a bank typically controlled the local government, was
central during the post-crisis period.
4.2.2. France
The network among the French financial institutions over the sub-periods are depicted in
Figure 7. Tables 8 and 9 show in more detail the results of the summary statistics of the
inter-institution connectedness and the centrality measures, respectively. From the figure, we
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Figure 7: France: Within-Country Networks
Links Density Community Size (max.) Average Path Length
2008-2009 23 0.82 5 1.18
2010-2012 19 0.68 4 1.32
2013-2015 13 0.46 5 1.54
Table 8: France: Summary statistics of inter-institution network over the sub-periods.
Rank 2008-2009 2010-2012 2013-2015
1 CIC - 1 GPA - 1 GCE - 1
2 GCE - 1 GCE - 1 GPA - 0.9
3 GPA - 1 ACA - 0.88 ACA - 0.81
4 ACA - 0.91 CIC - 0.88 BNP - 0.67
5 BPCE - 0.8 BNP - 0.88 GLE - 0.67
Table 9: France: Institutions ranked by eigenvector centrality
notice more interconnectedness during the crises periods than in post-crisis period. The total
number of links and density was highest during the financial crisis, followed by the sovereign
crisis. The average path length indicates that the rate of risk transmission was also higher
during the financial crisis than the sovereign crisis period (see Table 8). Both Groupama
(GPA) and Caisse d’Epargne (GCE) were central, as we expect, but so are the other large
French banks (all large and “too big to fail”).
4.2.3. Italy
The structure of the Italian institutions over the sub-periods are shown in Figure 8. The
results of the networks are similar to that of Germany and France in the sense that there was
more interconnectedness during the financial crisis and in the sovereign crisis periods than in
post-crisis period.
Table 10 shows that ranking the number of links, density and average path length follow
that of the French institutional structure. The only difference is that the maximal number of
communities of institutions was highest during the financial crisis, followed by the sovereign
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Figure 8: Italy: Within-Country Networks
Links Density Community Size (max.) Average Path Length
2008-2009 18 0.64 6 1.36
2010-2012 11 0.39 4 1.64
2013-2015 3 0.11 2 1.67
Table 10: Italy: Summary statistics of inter-institution network over the sub-periods.
Rank 2008-2009 2010-2012 2013-2015
1 UBI - 1 UBI - 1 BMPS - 1
2 US - 1 US - 1 US - 1
3 PMI - 0.84 PMI - 0.56 PMI - 0.62
4 ISP - 0.84 BMPS - 0.56 UBI - 0.62
5 BMPS - 0.74 BPSO - 0.56 G - 0
Table 11: Italy: Institutions ranked by eigenvector centrality
crisis. The post-crisis period, instead, leaves few links and communities among Italian insti-
tutions. This is consistent with the fact that the prevailing risk, after the crisis times, is at
the country level, rather than at the company level. The most central institutions according
to Table 11 are UBI, PMI, BPSO: all large cooperative banks, as well as the troubled Monte
dei Paschi di Siena (BMPS), recently nationalized.
4.2.4. Spain
We now turn our attention on Spain - the fourth largest economy in the EU. Figure
9 and Tables 12 and 13 show in more detail the results for the inter-institutions subgraph
that concerns Spain. We notice from these results that the situation in Spain is somewhat
intermediate between that of France and Italy, in the sense that there were many connections
during the crises periods, and less after crisis, but it remains an institutional diversification,
besides the country risk. Over the three sub-periods, the centrality analysis indicates that
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Figure 9: Spain: Within-Country Networks
the most Spanish institutions rotate around two large banks: Santander (SAN) and Banco
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA).
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Links Density Community Size (max.) Average Path Length
2008-2009 9 0.90 4 1.10
2010-2012 8 0.80 3 1.20
2013-2015 5 0.50 4 1.17
Table 12: Spain: Summary statistics of inter-institution network over the sub-periods.
Rank 2008-2009 2010-2012 2013-2015
1 BBVA - 1 SAN - 1 BBVA - 1
2 SAN - 1 BBVA - 1 SAN - 1
3 BKT - 1 POP - 0.86 SAB - 0.78
4 POP - 0.82 BKT - 0.86 BKT - 0.78
5 SAB - 0.82 SAB - 0.6 POP - 0
Table 13: Spain: Institutions ranked by eigenvector centrality
In the next sections, we consider the yearly inter-country and inter-institution graphs
between 2008–2015 to further understand the interconnectedness and centrality within each
of the years.
4.3. Yearly Inter-country Networks
We show in Figure 10, the yearly inter-country network between 2008–2015. The network
structures suggest that the peak of the effect of the financial and sovereign crisis among the EU
countries occurred mainly in 2008 and 2011, respectively, with the former interconnectedness
much denser than the latter. It can be deduced that 2009 experienced the residual effect of
the contagion in 2008. Years 2010 and 2012 can be described as the beginning and end of
the sovereign crisis. During the post-crisis period, we notice an increase in the inter-country
connections in 2014.
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Figure 10: Yearly inter-country network graphs. The links indicate signs of the correlation coefficients, green
indicate positive correlations and red for negative correlations.
Table 14, further shows that the maximal community of inter-country connections oc-
curred mainly in 2008 and 2011. Though the links and density of the network seem highest
in 2008 than in 2011, the maximal community size and average path length of the latter was
much higher than the former. This suggests that the rate of risk transmission among the EU
countries was much faster during the sovereign crisis than in the financial crisis. But then
again, not many of the countries were as connected as the 2008 financial crisis.
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Links Density Community Size (max.) Average Path Length
2008 31 0.56 6 1.45
2009 3 0.05 4 1.50
2010 5 0.09 2 2.33
2011 18 0.33 7 1.14
2012 2 0.04 3 1.33
2013 6 0.11 3 1.73
2014 7 0.13 6 1.93
2015 3 0.05 3 1.00
Table 14: Summary statistics of inter-institution network over the sub-periods.
Criteria Rank 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Degree 1 BE NL AT IT BE NL PT FR
2 FR IT IT NL IT IT IR NL
3 NL PT NL AT SP PT FR SP
4 PT SP SP BE AT SP GE AT
5 IT AT FR GE FI AT GR BE
Betweenness 1 BE NL AT IT BE NL PT AT
2 PT AT NL NL AT IT IR BE
3 FR BE IT GE FI SP AT FI
4 NL FI SP PT FR PT BE FR
5 SP FR BE AT GE AT FI GE
Eigenvector 1 NL NL AT IT BE NL PT NL
2 FR IT NL NL SP IT IR FR
3 BE PT SP AT IT SP IT SP
4 PT SP IT BE AT PT GE AT
5 IT AT PT GE FI AT GR BE
Table 15: Top five countries ranked according to degree, betweenness and eigenvector centrality.
A look at the centrality of the countries over the yearly windows as shown in Table 15
suggests that during the 2008 crisis, Belgium and France were more connected and central to
the spread of risk in the Euro area. However, during the 2011 sovereign crisis, Italy and the
Netherlands dominated the EU as “sources of contagion”.
4.4. Yearly Inter-institutional Networks
The results of the yearly inter-institutional networks and a summary statistics of the struc-
ture and centrality measures are presented in Figure 11 and Tables 16 and 17, respectively.
Consistent with the yearly inter-country analysis, we find evidence that the interconnected-
ness among the financial institutions also recorded its peak in 2008-2009 and 2011-2012. This
suggests that the vulnerability and rate of risk transmission that led to the financial crisis
was much higher in 2008 than the years after 2008.
Links Density Community Size (max.) Average Path Length
2008 437 0.36 17 1.61
2009 148 0.12 14 2.23
2010 76 0.06 12 2.60
2011 141 0.12 13 2.01
2012 124 0.10 11 2.22
2013 111 0.09 10 2.20
2014 92 0.08 16 2.67
2015 106 0.09 12 2.37
Table 16: Summary statistics of inter-institution network over the sub-periods.
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Figure 11: Yearly inter-institutional networks.
Criteria Rank 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Degree 1 CIC LDBH US GCE GCE GCE LDBH GCE
2 GPA CIC CIC NLB GPA LDBW GCE PEIR
3 GCE ALV GPA UBI ACA GPA BPCE ALPH
4 US US INGA PEIR ETE US PEIR EURB
5 LDBH INGA BPI US PEIR UBI BMPS ETE
Betweenness 1 CIC LDBH US GCE GPA GCE LDBH PEIR
2 GPA CIC INGA NLB GCE GPA GCE GCE
3 US US CIC UBI ETE US BPCE ALPH
4 ALPH BPI BPI BPI ALPH LDBW PEIR EURB
5 GCE BKT SAN CBK PEIR PEIR SNS BPI
Eigenvector 1 CIC LDBH US GCE GCE GCE GCE PEIR
2 GPA ALV CIC NLB GPA LDBW BPCE GCE
3 GCE CIC BPI UBI BKT GPA LDBH ALPH
4 US G GCE US ACA US BNP EURB
5 IKB INGA INGA DZB PEIR SNS GPA ETE
Table 17: Top five institutions ranked according to degree, betweennes and eigenvector centrality.
The centrality analysis of the yearly inter-institutional network as shown in Table 17
confirms the initial results that the French institutions (Groupama (GPA), Credit Industriel
(CIC) and Caisse d’Epargne (GCE)) were central to the spread of risk during the 2008
financial crisis and the 2011-2012 sovereign crisis.
5. Conclusions
The paper has proposed a two-layered tree network model that allows us to decompose
financial contagion into a global component, composed of inter-country contagion effects,
and a local component made up of inter-institutional contagion effects. The model has been
applied to a database containing the time series of daily CDS spreads of the major European
financial institutions (banks and insurance companies).
The result revealed a varying structure of interactions among countries and institutions
over different periods. More importantly, we find evidence of a high inter-country and inter-
institutional vulnerability at the onset of the financial and sovereign crisis. We also found
Belgium and France as central to the inter-country contagion in the Euro area during the
financial crisis, while Italy dominated the sovereign crisis. The French Groupama, Credit
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Industriel, and Caisse d’Epargne were central to the inter-institutional contagion in both
crises.
Further application of this work involves considering additional institutions, for which CDS
spreads are available, and robustness checks on the model, particularly extending the model
to a multilayered context, when more data, besides market prices, are taken into account.
An extension of the model formulation includes a dynamic transition in the global market
indicators which can be proxied by actual global financial and macroeconomic indicators
rather than a factor decomposition of the country-level indicators.
The results show that financial sector policies of major economies and variations in global
risk factors play a significant role in the creations of vulnerable financial environments for risk
propagation. It is therefore important to focus attention on how the interplay of international
and national financial policy initiatives can help ensure and enhance the financial system
function as a stable system. This can be achieved by promoting national and international
policies that minimize spillovers among inter-country financial systems and institutions.
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